A right to truth, justice and a remedy for African victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law by McDonald, Avril
A right to truth, justice and a remedy 
for African victims of serious violations 
of international humanitarian law 
AVRIL MCDONALD 
Managing Editor of the Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
Researcher at the TMC Asser fnstituut, The Hague 
1 INTRODUCTION 
African victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
victims of such violations the world over seem to be caught between a 
rock and a hard place, accessories to political processes that habitually see 
them, and the rule of law, as the losers, They are not usually consulted as 
to their views on how their states should deal with violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law that are so serious that they are considered 
international crimes; they are not generally asked what they want or 
need; they do not have a choice or any representation in the decision-
making process; they may be told that compromise is the price of peace 
which they simply have to accept; and, if they are lucky, they may be able 
to tell their story in an official, institutional environment that is sympa-
thetic if relatively toothless, 
The decision by national authorities to punish or to grant amnesty for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law or human rights is not 
usually a free choice between equally attractive and legitimate ways of 
dealing with a legacy of massive violations, The granting of amnesties 
along with the establishment of a national truth commission, rather than 
the adoption of a punitive approach, is often the only realistic way to 
ensure a peaceful transition from situations of armed conflict to peace or 
from dictatorial to democratic regimes, They are a compromise approach, 
with the truth commission frequently serving as a sop to the amnesties, a 
recognition of the need to take notice of the crimes and of the victims 
when national prosecutions are or seem to be impossible, I 
While some victims of atrocities committed either by the state or by 
non-state actors have an extraordinary capacity to forgive, and their 
demands of their assailants and of society are incredibly modest and do 
1 Judge Richard Goldstone said that "the [South African] TRC was a political decision, It 
wasn't taken for moral reasons or for reasons of justice, It was a political compromise 
between havmg Nuremberg-style trialS on the one hand and forgetting on the other", 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
not reflecr a desire for retribution, for many other vicrims, the need to 
see justice done is very real. Even the ideal truth commission or other 
non-judicial approaches have serious limitations if what is sought is some 
kind of reckoning for the perpetrator. Recognition of the existence and 
status of victims; their involvement in a process of truth-telling and dis-
covery; acknowledgement of the wrongs done to victims: the payment of 
reparations; rehabilitation; and other modes of compensation: these are 
all very well, and are, indeed, essential ingredients of any healing and 
reconciliation process, and should be part of every method of dealing with 
serious and widespread violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights. But, for many victims, beyond this is the need to see the 
worst organisers and perpetrators of the most heinous crimes prosecuted 
and punished. If this is not accomplished, the unfulfilled need for justice 
and the widespread sense that law is worthless may remain an open 
wound, and reconciliation may be thwarted. 
This paper examines the of three African states that are 
currently dealing - each in its own way with a legacy of serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law and human rights: South Africa, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Africa as an urgent subject for study 
considering the enormous numbers of victims of international crimes in 
her constituent countries and the devastating effects that the many armed 
conflicts there have wrought on the civilian population, The aim is to 
discover where and how African victims of international crimes fit into the 
processes that transitional states use to deal with international crimes and 
their perpetrators, and to what extent, if at all, the needs and maybe even 
rights of victims are taken into account in the terms of peace agreements, 
and in the implementation of their provisions, National and international 
approaches to dealing with serious international crimes generally focus on 
the perpetrators rather than their victims. A few perpetrators can create a 
very substantial problem, and victims are generally not problem-creating, 
so the greater proportion of resources for dealing with criminality of this 
type is devoted to the instigators of the mayhem, rather than its casual· 
ties. Victims are generally on the of the process, whatever that 
may be in the circumstances. While they suffer the most. they tend to be 
accorded relatively little attention and concern. 
However, the exclusion of victims of international crimes from what-
ever method for dealing with international criminality is adopted, or their 
marginalisation, is both inequitable and shortsighted. Moreover, it may 
violate the victims' rights under international law. Establishing rights 
2 Mr Dullah Omar, the then·South African Minister for Justice said "often, victims seeking 
compensation seek very little, a tombstone for the grave of a loved one, the pOSSibility 
140 
to be educated or to have to medical treatment .... The victims of apartheid 
have displayed remarkable of lhey have not asked for 
revenge or vengeance: they've asked for a measure of 
understanding." 'Statement made on 'Facing the Past'. Newshour with Jim Lehrer. On-









































I A RIGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS I 
under international law of victims of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights to truth, justice, and, more substan-
tially. a remedy. would bolster arguments for giving more attention and 
weight to victims in designing approaches for dealing with international 
crimes. at both national and international levels. Any rights of victims 
must of course be weighed against the rights of the perpetrators, respect 
for which is paramount. as well as the interests and needs of the society 
in general. It is not suggested here that the rights of victims should take 
precedence over the rights of accused persons, or that responses to such 
criminality should be driven only by a concern for victims. Indeed, an 
approach that only takes account of the interests and desires of victims 
may turn out to be almost wholly retributive, which may not be in the 
interests of the wider society or serve the goal of reconciliation. However, 
legitimate concern for the rights of perpetrators and the needs of the 
society as a whole cannot be used as an excuse for ignoring the legitimate 
needs. interests and rights of victims. 
Considering the rights of victims of international crimes may also assist 
in drawing attention to the position of these people as the most and worst 
affected. individually and collectively, directly and indirectly. The effects 
of victimisation can have repercussions across a whole society. It is also 
an attempt to promote an alternative way of approaching international 
criminality. and, most fundamentally, considering it not as a bipolar 
relationship between the perpetrator and the state, with the victim at best 
in a supporting role, but instead as a triangular relationship involving the 
victim, the perpetrator and the state. There is some reason to believe that 
the practical application of an approach that takes due cognisance of 
victims might prove beneficial to the process of reconciliation in divided 
and antagonistic societies. 
Our three case studies have each taken very different approaches to 
dealing with human rights and humanitarian law violations, and the 
position of the victims of these crimes differs in each case. The first, South 
Africa, seeking to deal with its legacy of apartheid. has taken a middle 
road, establishing its Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and 
granting amnesties to the perpetrators of crimes. but only in respect of 
persons who first give a full and truthful rendition of the facts and only 
when the crimes were political and proportionate to the aim sought to be 
achieved (Sarkin 1996; 1997; 1998) However. the amnesties in South 
Africa have not let everyone off the hook. Persons who did nor apply for 
amnesty or in respect of whom amnesties have been denied are liable to 
be prosecuted. Victims have been able to tell their stories before the TRC, 
and the Promotion of Truth and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 provides 
for compensation to victims at the same time as it denies them a legal 
right to pursue either criminal or civil claims. 
Rwanda, faced with a rather different sort of problem. the mass murder 
of up to one million of its population, has tried to take a more aggressive 
approach. The government. alongSide the ad hoc International Criminal 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
people implicated in the genocide (Sarkin 1999). It has faced, and contin-
ues to face. massive problems and challenges. The judicial system was 
destroyed in the genocide The government has over 130000 people in 
prison and few resources to try them. Even a country with adequate 
resources and infrastructure would find it impossible to undertake prose-
cutions on this scale. Rwanda has come to realise that not all of those who 
are guilty can ever be adequately punished. However, some form of 
judicial response to atrocities on such a scale is required. The Organic Law 
of 30 August 1996 on the organisation of prosecutions for offences consti-
tuting the crime of or crimes against humanity since I October 
1990' provides the framework for prosecuting the perpetrators and 
for compensating victims of the genocide. 
Sierra Leone has taken the most problematic route. Its July (999 Peace 
Agreement' provides for a blanket amnesty for all persons involved in the 
eight and a half year-old civil war. It is unlikely that prosecutions will be 
undertaken, at least at a national level. although a national truth and 
reconciliation commission is in the process of being established. as well as 
an international Commission of Inquiry, and international prosecutions 
have even been although no-one should be holding his breath 
for the latter. The victims of the atrocities perpetrated by both state and 
primarily non-state actors have been denied any legal right to pursue civil 
or criminal claims before the national courts. 
One obviously cannot draw any conclusions as to the legal positions of 
victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law from the 
practice of these three states alone. To understand the international legal 
position within which the position of victims of these violations must be 
considered. it will be necessary to examine the experiences of several 
states in dealing with serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
But first, a word about the kinds of crimes with which this paper is con-
cerned, and then a brief discussion of what is meant by and the content 
of the right to truth. and a remedy within the context in which 
these terms are used here. 
2 THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
This paper is not concerned with the full range of behaviour that is crimi-
naJised under international law, or even all of the types of criminal be-
haviour featuring in the International Law Commission's Draft Code of 
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (International Law 
Commission 1996). Its ambit, rather. is limited to serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, using that term in its broadest sense to 
3 Published in The genOCide and the crimes against humanity in Rwanda law 1996. Re-
printed in TMC Asser Insritullt 1998:625-635. For a detailed commentary on the law 
see De Beer 1999. 
4 Lome Peace between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 










































A RIGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE & t\ REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS I 
include not only violations of the laws and customs of war, but also 
cerrain acts which could also be considered as extremely grave human 
rights violations when committed by a state, that is, genocide and crimes 
against humanity, These latter crimes can also be perpetrated by non-
Slates actors who are sufficiently organised to be in a position to commit 
them, For our purposes, useful reference points are thus the Statutes of 
the ad hoc International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (lCTY) and 
Rwanda (lCTR) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
the latter which has jurisdiction over four categories of crimes aggreSSion, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, This paper is not 
concerned with aggression, however, but only with the other three 
ries of crimes, 
The violations of the laws and customs of war with which the paper is 
concerned include the law applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts, Applicable during the former are grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additlonal Protocol 
I of 1977 as well as customary international law, Applicable during non-
international armed conflict are common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol II of 1977, inter alia, S as well as 
some customary international law, Common Article 3 has been found by 
the International Court of Justice to be customary,C while the ICTY con-
firmed this and also declared that the core elements of Protocol II, par, 
ticularly its Article 4 (fundamental guarantees) are customary in nature," 
While there has been a willingness by some states and jurists to con-
sider that grave breaches may be considered as applicable, not only in 
international armed conflicts but also in internal armed conflicts,? for the 
purposes of this paper. grave breaches are considered in their conven-
tional sense, that is, as applicable only when committed against protected 
persons as defined in common Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions, that 
is, persons in the hands of a parry to the conflict of which they are not 
nationals, Thus, it is accepted here that grave breaches can only be com, 
mitted during international armed conflicts, However, the vast majority of 
armed conflicts today, in Africa and elsewhere, are non-international 
armed conflicts, Thus, for our purposes, of greater practical importance 
than the grave breaches provisions are the parts of the law applicable in 
non-international or internal armed conflicts, While much controversy has 
surrounded the question whether the law applicable in internal armed 
5 For a discussion of the law applicable in non-international armed conflicts and the 
question of criminal liability, see McDonald 1999:79-104. 
6 Nicaragua case Merits ICJ Rep 1986 para 218. 
7 'Customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common 
Article 3, as supplemented other general principles and rules on the protection of 
victims of internal armed and tor breaching certain fundamental prinCIples and 
rules regarding means and melhods of combat in civil strife'. Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, 
case IT-94-1 'AR72. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdic-
tion 2 October 1995 para 134. See also generally section IV of the decision. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
conflicts gives rise to individual criminal responsibility. the decision on 
jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case." and subsequent 
cases of the ICTY and ICTR" have all found that individual criminal re-
sponsibility for breaches of the law applicable in internal armed conflicts 
arises under customary international humanitarian law." That war crimes 
in internal armed conflicts give rise to individual criminal responsibility 
has also been confirmed by their inclusion in the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court," as well as, previously, in the Statute of the ICTR. 
3 THE RIGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE AND A REMEDY FOR 
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITI\RIAN 
LAW 
In the context in which they are considered here, truth, justice and a 
remedy refer to three claims that are inextricably interlinked. While they 
exist as separate concepts, from the perspective of the victim of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, they are connected. Truth is 
a form of justice and also a remedy; justice consists of truth and a rem-
edy; a remedy consists of truth and justice. Thus, while for the sake of 
clarity we will consider them separately below, they are in fact a troika. 
3.1 Truth 
The subject of truth has engaged philosophers and all thinkers, including 
lawyers, for as long as civilisation has existed. And yet, after all these 
efforts, truth remains a slippery notion. As a recent commentator notes, 
'''truth', like 'justice' and 'reconciliation', is an elusive concept that defies 
rigid definitions" (Parlevliet 1998: 141). Unfortunately, there is no room 
here for any meaningful contribution to this incessant discussion. 
For our purposes, what is important is not so much the ability to reach 
a definition of truth, but rather to determine whether the search for and 
discovery of 'the truth' can be regarded as a worthwhile endeavour and 
an end in itself, or whether the search for 'the truth' should be seen as a 
preliminary step on a journey to some other ultimate goal From the 
former perspective, finding the truth is not seen as a precursor to (crimi-
nal) justice, and ultimately a judicial remedy for the victims, but as a 
substitute for judicial justice or indeed as a form of justice in itself." 
According to Parlevliet (1998: 142), "the increasing number of such bodies 
9 See footnote 7. 
10 Inter alia Prosecutor v Ze/nil Delalic Zdravko MuC1c Hazim Delic and Esad Landco 
(celebici). IT-96-2 1-T 16 November 1998 at 1 13; The Prosecutor v Akayesu case ICTR-96-
4-T Judgment 2 September 1998. 
11 See McDonald 1999. 
12 In Article 8. For a discussion of the negotiations on the parts of Article 8 dealing with 
war crimes committed in an internal armed conflict see Robinson & von Hebel Forth-
coming 1999. 










































A RIGHT TO TRUTH. JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS I 
[truth commissions] that investigate and record yet do not punish, indi-
cates that 'telling the truth' has come to be regarded as an important 
contribution to strengthen the rule of law. This is remarkable considering 
that punishment is usually regarded as an effective deterrent and retribu-
tion; criminal prosecutions have thus often been emphasised as the best 
approach towards past violations in asserting the rule of law". One could 
draw a different conclusion. Rather than the establishment of truth com-
missions being seen as an alternative, even preferable. way of dealing 
with the past, or strengthening the rule of law, it can be seen as the defeat 
of justice, as the triumph of utilitarianism and compromise over the rule 
of law and justice. 
As Parlevliet notes (1998: 143). the search for the truth is not only about 
gaining knowledge. but also about providing acknowledgement: "the 
determination of facts about the past, and a FUll, public and official ac-
knowledgement thereof. The basic facts of what happened are often 
already known to some extent, in which case establishing the truth comes 
down to confirming what is already widely believed to be true". This is 
also the view of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Question of the impu-
nity of perpetrators of violations of human rights (civil and political), :vJr 
Louis Joiner. 14 Mr JOinet refers to the right to know, rather than the right to 
truth. although in his reports. these are closely related concepts. In fact. 
the right to know is probably broader than the right to truth, certainly in 
the context in which the latter term is used here, encompassing the full 
range of available human knowledge and information. 
The debate over whether truth is objective or subjective is never-ending. 
and. again. there is no room here to engage with this discussion. Some 
commentators argue that truth is objective. According to Carr (1998:88), 
truth is "the objective matter par excellence. What is true is true for every-
one ... independently of what anyone believes". On the other hand, "some 
scholars reject the idea that truth is ever objective, but argue instead in 
favour of a contextual conception of truth" (Parlevliet 1998: 147) 
In the view of this writer, there is no absolute truth; facts are subjec-
tively_ interpreted and perhaps it is impossible to find a version of the truth 
that satisfies everyone. In the context of dealing With serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights, we can only try to 
establish the most objective truth possible, by means of witness testi· 
mony, and forensic and other evidence. To be credible and accepted by 
the majority of the population and the wider world, determinations of 
truth must be made by a body that is as far as possible above reproach. It 
14 In his revised and expanded Final Report submined pursuant to Sub-Commission 
decision 19961 I 19. Mr joiner stated that the right to know. expressed as one of the 
three fundamental rigllts of victims (along With the right [0 justice and to reparation). is 
not just a right of individuals or their families. it is a collective nght. whose corollary is 
the duty to remember on the part of the state. It implies tile preservation of archives. 
UN report EICN 4/Sub.21 1997/2026 June 1997 paras 17 ~25. 
15 See for example Weeramantry 1997. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
should be independent. impartial and adequately-resourced. and of a 
stature that will ensure that the version of the truth it delivers will be 
widely accepted. This author agrees with Parlevliet (1998: I 52) that a 
precondition for achieving this "truth" is an open dialogue. Thus, a body 
that is established with a view to unearthing "the truth" must provide the 
right conditions for an open exchange of views. This means that the 
victims ideally should be able to contribute to the dialogue without fear of 
retribution and the same is true for the perpetrators. One could argue that 
perpetrators will not speak openly if they fear prosecution and punish-
ment and that amnesty for the perpetrators is one way of encouraging 
perpetrators to speak freely. On the other hand, one can equally assert 
that where, as in Sierra Leone, blanket amnesties are given even before 
the establishment of a truth commission, any incentive for perpetrators to 
come forward is removed, and the consequence may be a very one-sided 
version of the truth, with only the victims' stories being related. This begs 
the question as to the "best" way to reach "the truth". For many people, 
and for many victims, the only acceptable truth is a judicial truth. But if 
the judiciary is impotent or lacks credibility and independence, or if, for 
political reasons, a judicial solution is not possible, the task of managing 
and delivering the truth may fall to another body, which may also be 
vested with an authoritative status and which may be able to deliver a 
credible and acceptable version of the truth. The South African TRC is a 
good, perhaps rare, example of a non-judicial body that has executed its 
mandate of reaching the truth with admirable impartiality, independence 
and integrity, but here, it should be remembered, the amnesties were 
contingent on telling the truth, openly and honestly. In order to reach a 
broadly accepted version of the truth, it is important that the truth-telling 
process not be one-sided, but that it should involve perpetrators as well as 
victims. Perpetrators will probably need some incentive to come forward 
and tell the truth. One carrot is making the grant of amnesty conditional 
on the perpetrators' giving a full and honest rendition of the facts. 
It is impossible to judge or choose between a judicial truth and one that 
is reached in a different manner since, as noted, it is not a free choice, 
and TRCs are usually the second-best option, when prosecutions are 
impossible. It would appear that, at least in some instances, such bodies 
are capable of managing the truth and reconciliation process in a way that 
promotes integration rather than divisiveness, and of delivering to victims 
and to the population at large a version of events that they can, for the 
most part, accept, as well as some sense of satisfaction. To achieve this, 
however, there are certain procedural minimum requirements. In par-
ticular, it is necessary for the process to be as transparent as possible. 
There will be occasions where some secrecy is necessary, for example, to 
protect witnesses, but, for the most part, the work of a TRC should be 
conducted in public, its findings should be made public, and it should be 
able to identify and name perpetrators if it is to fulfill its truth-telling 
function adequately. 
While prosecutions and TRCs are usually seen as, and frequently are, 
alternative processes, in some situations, the establishment of a TRC can 










































A RIGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRlCAN VICTiMS OF SERlOIJS VIOLATIONS 
the (CTY, Judge Richard Goldstone (1998) has said that while the "judicial 
process is essential for reconciliation to begin, it is insufficient alone to 
satisfy the human need for knowing the truth of a tragic series of events. 
In addition to criminal prosecution, it is necessary for a damaged society 
to arrive at a wider understandtng of the causes of its suffering". 
A complementary process might best be realised in a situation where 
amnesties are offered to lesser criminals in return for a full confession and 
apology, and giving evidence against persons accused of more serious 
crimes, including serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights. Any complementary or hybrid scheme should be planned 
and implemented in a co-ordinated way, so that the relationship between 
these processes and the lines of demarcation of their roles are made clear 
and the potential for conflict between them is minimised. 
Perhaps the key question for our purposes is whether the right to truth 
is an international legal right rather than merely an aspiration Mr Joiner, 
who has by now presented three reports on the question of the impunity 
of perpetrators of violations of human rights (civil and political)' 7 uses the 
language of human rights. However, the JOinet principles, along with the 
van Boven principles on the right to reparation for victims of gross viola-
tions of human rights and humanitarian law," appear to be catalogues of 
aspirations rather than legally enforceable rights. As reports of special 
rapporteurs prepared pursuant to resolutions of the UN Sub-committee on 
the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, they are 
not legally binding on states. However, an examination of state practice 
reveals that in the majority of states that have moved from conflict to 
peace and from repression to democracy, some form of truth telling has 
been a part of the transition process. Even where circumstances have 
prevented the national authorities from undertaking prosecutions, it has 
been recognised that some form of institutional investigation and ac-
knowledgement of the past are essential elements of the reconciliation 
process. Practice indicates that states believe that victims of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights deserve at 
least this much. The quescion is whecher chis can be considered as a right 
of victims or simply as a concession of states. However, if one considers 
truth as a form of a remedy, one can regard it as a right under interna-
tional human rights law. All of the international and regional human rights 
instruments recognise the right of individuals to a remedy. 
3,2 Justice and remedies 
In this context, justice is given two main interpretations, while recognising 
that, like truth, justice is a nebulous concept, subject to endless debate. 
First, criminal justice, that is, the prosecution and punishment of persons 
17 E/CN 4/Sub 211996118 29 1996: EICN 4/Sub 211997120 of 26 June 1997 and EICN 
4iSub 211 997120IRev 1 of Ooober 1997. 
18 Van Boven reports UN report EICN 4/Sub 2/1993/8 of 2 July 1993: E/CN 41Sub 











































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law. This can 
be accomplished at the national level, by the state where the violations 
have been committed, and by states exercising universal jurisdiction over 
these crimes, and also by international criminal tribunals or courts. We 
can also speak of justice in a much broader sense, including, for our 
purposes, in the sense of the victim's satisfaction with a result and the 
restoration of the status quo ante, in so far as that is possible. Even in the 
absence of criminal justice, there could be alternative forms of justice. 
Victims could achieve some sense of satisfaction, if not by seeing their 
assailants prosecuted and punished, at least by taking part in the work of 
a truth commission, by being recognised and acknowledged and by 
attaining some form of restitution. 
The subject of remedies is very complex, and our discussion here can 
only offer a perfunctory analysis. A remedy could consist of a broad 
variety of possibilities. First, there are judicial remedies. This could mean 
that the perpetrator is prosecuted and punished before a criminal court, 
whether national or international, or alternatively that the victim has 
access to civil remedies. In the absence of judicial remedies, there may 
still be the possibility of other forms of remedies. A non-judicial body, 
such as a TRC, may be empowered to provide for remedies in respect of 
victims, such as monetary or other forms of compensation, access to 
services and grants, and various forms of rehabilitation. As shown below 
in part 5, almost all states that have gone through a transition period, 
from dictatorship to democracy, or from armed conflict to peace, have 
granted victims of the crimes committed some form of a remedy, al-
though one can certainly argue over the adequacy of such remedies. It is 
worthwhile considering what might be the legal source of any right of 
victims to a remedy in respect of serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law, and whether states that grant victims remedies act in the 
belief that they have an international obligation to do so. 
Possible sources of a right of victims to a remedy could be general in-
ternational law, where the right of victims to a remedy is regarded as the 
flip side of the responsibility of states to provide one, assuming we can 
show that such responsibility actually exists, or, alternatively, and more 
promisingly, under international human rights law. 
3.2.1 State responsibility 
The principle of state responsibility for violations of international obliga-
tions is well established in international law. It arises, inter alia, in respect 
of serious violations of international humanitarian law, as provided for in 
the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
lo 
The state is responsible for all acts committed by members of its armed 
forces, but not for other forces, including non-state actors. However, 
19 Article 3 Hague Conventions and Regulations of 1907; Article 51 (I) Geneva Convention 
of 1949; Article 52(11) Geneva Convention; Article 131 (III) Geneva Convention and Arti-










































A RIGHT TO TRUTH. JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOl.ATIONS 
under international law, the principle of state responsibility concerns 
obligations interstate, and does not regulate relationships between states 
and individuals. "The draft articles of the International Law Commission 
on State Responsibility. provide that any breach of an obligation under 
international law, entails a secondary obligation to make reparation 
designed to wipe out all the consequences of an unlawful act (Article 41). 
But it is by no means clear whether these rules, which codify the tradi-
tional law of inter-state relations, also apply to the relationship between 
states and their citizens" (Tomuschat 1999: I 52) 
It is not true to say that state responsibility can never concern individu-
als, or that states do not have any obligations towards individuals. States 
may, in fact, be responsible to the nationals of third states. bur, in most 
cases, any claims by them cannot be made directly but must be made 
through their state of nationality. This was stated to be the case in several 
recent cases. although another case has said that individuals can make 
claims directly against third states. In Japan, the District Court, ruling on 
the question of whether former Filipino "comfort women" could claim 
compensation against Japan for the acts of Japanese soldiers, found that a 
state was not liable to directly compens~1te the individual victims of other 
belligerent states. This was reaffirmed in other Japanese cases concerning 
prisoners of war and comfort women, which confirmed that individual 
victims could not seek compensation under Article 3 of the Hague Con-
ventions or under customary international law. An American case con-
cerning slave labour in the Second World War also found that "the cases 
are unanimous ... in holding that nothing in the Hague Convention even 
impliedly grants individuals the right to seek damages for violation of [its] 
provision".~ These cases are currently in the appeals phase. 
However, in a recent decision of the Russian Constitutional Court con-
cerning culrural property transferred into the USSR after the Second World 
War which considered Article 18(1) of the Federal Russian Act of ]5 April 
] 998 on Cultural Property Transferred into the USSR, in Consequence of 
World War II and being found in the Territory of the Russian Federation, 
**found that while the intergovernmental (diplomatic) way of solving 
20 Korean eX"comforr women' v japanese Government Yamaguchi District Courf 27 April 
1998. Reponed in fianrei Jiho 1642:24-88: Filipino eX-'comfort women' v japanese Gov-
ernment Tokyo District Court 9 OctOber 1998 not yet reported: English ex-pnsoners of 
war et al v Japanese Government Tokyo Disfrict Court 26 November 1998 not yet re~ 
Du[ch ex-prisoners of war et al v japanese Government District Court 30 
1998. Reponed in fianrei Taimuzu 991 :262-277. For a see Japan, 
in TMC Asser lnsliluut forthcoming 1999. 
21 Fishel v BASF Group et al Civil No 4·96·CV·1 0449 Lexis 21230 (SO Iowa 1998) 
22 Which provided that only foreign governments have the right to file claims concerning 
property issues. on behalf of their citizens. and that these claims should be 
addressed only to the government of Russia. No claims will be received from individuals 
and organisations. Adopted by GosDuma (lower Chamber of the Russian Parliament) in 
5 February 1997, approved by the Soviet of Federation (the upper Chamber of the Russian 
Parliamem) on 5 March 1997. signed by Russian President on 15 April 1998. Entered 
into force on 20 April 1998. the of its official publication in Sobranya Zakonodatyelsrva 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
property issues in case of restitution and reparations may sometimes be 
the easiest way for citizens to recover their goods, it cannot be understood 
as denying access to whoever wants to follow the normal judicial proce-
dure. Consequently, access to the court for individual foreigners is stitt 
open, under international law and the Russian Constitution. 
Even if states could be held responsible to nationals of third states, the 
principle of state responsibility does not govern the relationship between 
states and their own nationals. Strictly speaking, this is a matter of human 
rights law. According to Tomuschat (1999: 152): hsince States are obligated 
to respect and ensure human rights. general disregard for such elemen-
tary entitlements of the human purpose calls for suitable remedies .... No 
subsequent Government. even if it has nothing to do with a prior system 
of terror and injustice, may ignore what happened before it assumed 
power. Human rights do not only have a preventative function. they 
additionally require adequate measures of reparation as a response to 
their breach". 
3.2.2 Human rights law 
The right to a remedy for violations of fundamental human rights is 
guaranteed in all of the major human right conventions.): One can deduce 
from the fact it is contained in every human rights instrument that it is a 
universal customary norm. Although the African Charter does not speak 
expressly of a right to a remedy, it states that everyone whose fundamen-
tal rights have been infringed has the right to have his or her cause heard 
by a national court. However, hif the victim has gained some sort of 
national redress (which may not necessarily be adequate) in respect of the 
communication. it appears that the case will be inadmissible on the 
grounds that an amicable settlement has been attained" (Murray 
1997:412) 
Victims of human rights abuses in Africa may have some recourse be-
fore [he African CommiSSion, claiming that their human rights have been 
23 Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
150 
right (Q an effective the competent national 
fundamemal rights by the constitution or by law". Article 2 of the 
national Covenam on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR) obliges state parnes to guaramee 
rhe rights contained therein. Article 2(3) specifically provides for the right ro a 
Under Article 4 of the ICCPR. state panies may derogate from Arricle 2 during states of 
emergency or armed conflicts. However, although the right is suspended and thus is 
unenforceable the state of emergency or armed con flier , it is reinstated once the 
emergency or conflict ends and must then be enforced. Under Article J 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth 10 thiS Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding ttlat the violation has been committed by persons acting in 
an official capacity" Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights also pro-
vides for a to a remedy. Under Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' "1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This 
comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent narional organs against acts of vio-
lating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions. laws, regu-









































A RlGHT TO TRUTH. JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRlCAN VICTIMS OF SERlOUS VIOL,'\ TIONS I 
abused and that their right to recourse before their national courts has not 
been respected. They might also be able to petition the UN Human Rights 
Committee regarding a violation of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. However. the remedy which is guaranteed in each 
case is one in respect of violations of the human rights conventions; thus, 
it would probably not cover violations of international humanitarian law. 
There is nothing in the African Convention that says that victims of hu-
manitarian law violations should have the right to recourse before national 
courts in respect of violations of humanitarian law, or, as a last resort, [Q 
the African Commission. And there is nothing in Geneva law that says that 
victims of humanitarian law violations have a right to a remedy before 
national bodies in respect of violations of the Geneva Conventions or their 
Additional Protocols, Nor do they apparently have any right [Q petition 
international human rights bodies in respect of violations of humanitarian 
law. In this respect, human rights and humanitarian law are distinct 
bodies of law. This means that while they may have the right co remedy in 
respect of violations of fundamental human rights by states or by persons 
acting on behalf of states, this would not cover violations of humanitarian 
law by rebels, UnFortunately, these are the people who are perpetrating 
the most atrocious and widespread violations in AFrica today, 
Recent years have seen a willingness by human rights bodies to 
consider and refer to humanitarian law, although they have not yet gone 
so far as to proclaim a remedy in respect of humanitarian law violations, 
enforceable through the human rights bodies. In fact, that may be impos-
sible as long as the human rights bodies are only willing to consider 
applications made against states. But the Inter-American CommiSSion has 
gone so far as to say that it can directly apply humanitarian law.'" 
While regional courts may not be able to grant specific remedies in re-
spect of humanitarian law violations, they can declare an amnesty law to 
be illegal, which may open up some other channels of resort for victims of 
humanitarian law violations, in particular, before their national courts. In 
1992, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ruled that am-
nesty laws immunising military ofFenders in El Salvador, Uruguay and 
Argentina violated the American Convention on Human Rights./" The 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in February 1994 again 
found the Salvadoran amnesty to be a violation of EI Salvador'S commit-
ments under the American Convention on Human Rights. It found the 
amnesty unlawful "because it makes possible a 'reciprocal amnesty' 
without First acknowledging responsibility (despite the recommendations 
of the Truth Commission); because it applies to crimes against humanity, 
24 See Imer-American Commission on Human Rights Report 1/99 case 10.480 27 January 
1999: the Tab/ada Case Inter-American Commission of Hurnan Rights Report 55/97, 
case ! 1.137 Argentina OEA/Ser/LlVII1.97 Doc 38 30 October 1997: Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Report 1/99 case! 0.480 27 January 1999 
25 Report 26192 (EI Salvador) Inter-An (HR 83 OEA/ser LlVIII 83 (1992): Report 29/92 
(Uruguay) Inter-Am CHR 154 OEA/ser Llil 83 doc 25 (l992l: Report 28/92 (Argentina) 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &, DEVELOPMENT 
and because it eliminates any possibility of obtaining adequate pecuniary 
compensation, primarily for victims. Salvadoran human rights groups 
unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court to find the amnesty uncon-
stitutional".:' Lately, the tide has been shifting, however. After years of 
finding the Chilean self-amnesty law to be legal," the Chilean Supreme 
Court in 1 998 declared it to be contrary to international human rights 
law. This decision is discussed below in part 5. 
Unfortunately, for the majority of victims of humanitarian law violations 
in Africa, unless they can show that they are also victims of human rights 
violations, there is little hope of redress before human rights bodies. The 
major gap in the law concerns responsibility of rebels in internal armed 
conflicts. States are not responsible, civilly or criminally, for their behav-
iour. Victims of their crimes would seem to have little possibility of re-
dress before regional or international human rights bodies. They may be 
able to sue individual rebels under national law, but most amnesty laws 
preclude this. Criminal prosecution is usually not possible either. An 
amnesty law may have prevented prosecution in some or all cases. 
If national prosecutions or civil suits are not possible, there are a few 
remaining hopes of obtaining a remedy. 
3.2.3 Other possible remedies 
Prosecutions could be undertaken or civil suits initiated in the courts of 
third states. As we will see below, several states have undertaken prosecu-
tions against non-nationals based on universal jurisdiction or indicated 
that they are in a pOSition to do SO.'0 Most of these cases have been initi-
ated by victims, and in some countries, victims can become parties 
civiles.3( Several victims have pursued civil suits in the United States under 
the Alien Tort Crimes Act, in some cases obtaining huge awards, although 
collecting them is next to impossible." 
The only other possibility is prosecution by an international criminal 
tribunal or court. Regarding the International Criminal Court, such prose-
cutions can only concern crimes committed after the entry into force of 
26 US Delegation to the ICC, Draft Paper on State PraC[ice Regarding Amnesties and 
Pardons presented to Preparatory Committee Fourth Session (August 1997). 
27 For a discussion see Roht-Arriaza &, Gibson:843. 
28 Supreme Court 9 September 1998 Rol 469-98 concerning the illegal detention ot Pedro 
Poblete Cordova. 
29 For an overview of recent caselaw see Kamminga 2000. 
30 In France, for example, the suit against Wenceslas Munyeshyaka was initiated by 
victims. The French Cour de Cassation agreed that Munyeshyaka, a Rwandan priest re-
Siding in France and accused of genOCide and crimes against humanity, could be tried 
in France for these crimes, if the accused was present on French territory and if the ac-
cusations covered faC[s which, under a different qualification, would come under the 
competence of the French couns. See In re Wenceslas Munyeshyaka Cour de Cassation 
Paris 6 January 1998 ReVIle generalE' dE' droit international public 102825. For analysiS. 
see Stern 1999525. 










































A RlGHT TO TRl:TH. JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRlCAN VICTIMS OF SERlOUS VIOLA TIOr-;S 
the Statute. However. conceivably. ad hoc tribunals could be established 
by the Security Council with jurisdiction over certain crimes committed in 
particular places. Such tribunals have recently been mooted for Sierra 
Leone and East Timor. and one cannot completely rule them out for these 
and other places. Even when the ICC comes into being. there may still be 
room for ad hoc I nternational Criminal Tribunals. If prosecutions were 
successfully undertaken by an International Criminal Tribunal. this could 
open the door to some sort of a civil remedy for the victims. The provi-
sions of the ICTR and ICTY in this respect should not. however. serve as a 
model for any future ad hoc tribunals. There is nothing in the statutes of 
either tribunal concerning remedies for victims. Under Rule 106 of the 
ICTY. individuals must pursue their claims through their national courts, 
under their national legislation. although the judgment of the tribunal is 
binding as to the criminal responsibility of the convicted person for any 
injury. As recent commentators have noted. "these rules fall well short of 
providing reparations or establishing a compensation scheme" (Clarke & 
Tolbert 1998). 
In many cases. it would be impossible for victims to pursue remedies 
before national courts. and they may be prevented from doing so by 
amnesty legislation. Thus, such a provision would not prove very useful in 
the Statute of any International Criminal Tribunal for Sierra Leone. for 
example. Much more useful is when an international coun is able to make 
awards itself, directly enforceable against convicted persons. The Statute 
of the ICC goes far beyond the tribunals in providing that "The Court may 
make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate 
reparations to. or in respect of, victims. including restitution, compen-
sation and rehabilitation"," Such a provision would usefully be included in 
the statutes of any future ad hoc tribunals, Together with a provision 
enabling the tribunal to seize the assets of convicted persons, this could 
provide a solid legal basis for an enforceable right to a remedy in respect 
of serious humanitarian law violations. 
Even supposing an international criminal tribunal or tribunals were to 
be established. their reach will be very limited, and they will not respond 
to the needs of the vast majority of victims of serious humanitarian law 
violations in Africa, Into this void steps the other forms of non-judicial 
remedies. numerous in character. which in almost every case form part of 
the response of governments to a legacy of humanitarian law or human 
rights violations, Monetary reparations are often provided for, in some 
cases. through trust funds established for this purpose. Payments may be 
made to individual victims and/or their relatives or to groups and com-
munities, Victims and their relatives may also be entitled under a national 
peace and reconciliation law to other. non-monetary forms of compensa-
tion, such as medical services or educational grants, Remedies can also 
take other forms, For example, a national holiday in honour of the victims 
32 Article I I (I) ICC Statute. 










































may be declared. or monuments to commemorate them may be built. 
Streets may be renamed in their honour. These kinds of remedies. though 
they are no substitute for judicial remedies. are nonetheless important 
and a mark of respect to victims of terrible abuses. 
Whether or not there is any international obligation on states to provide 
remedies in respect of serious violations of international humanitarian 
law. even states that opt for amnesties tend to make some provision for 
remedies, monetary and otherwise, for victims. In fact, state practice 
indicates that this is the rule, rather than the exception. 
4 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITION REGARDING AMNESTIES 
AND THE DUTY TO PROSECUTE 
The legal pOSition regarding amnesties under international law depends 
on the nature of the crime. It is widely considered that amnesties are 
illegal with respect to crimes rise to an obligation aut dedere aut 
judicare (prosecute or that is. the obligation that arises under 
treaty law with respect to the breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions. violations of the Apartheid Convention, violations of the 
Torture Convention and violations of the Slavery Convention. 
The situation regarding other crimes is less clear. Certain crimes give rise to 
responsibilities erga omnes. meaning that all states and all of humankind have 
an interest in seeing them However, it is not entirely clear whether 
this is a duty or merely a competence of states. Crimes giving rise to responsi-
bilities erga omnes include war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Recently. a Belgian court found that it could exercise universal jurisdiction over 
crimes against humanity based on customary international law, even though 
Belgium at that time had not yet legislation to implement crimes 
against humanity into its legal system. Many states have adopted legislation 
enabling them to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity,'" 
and it is clear that they are able to do so, but some commentators nonetheless 
argue that permissive rather than mandatory jurisdiction arises with respect to 
crimes under customary international law. Another commentator concurs that 
the legal interest erga omnes permits any state to exercise universal jurisdiction 
over persons suspected of committing crimes against humanity (Bassiouni 
34 Decision of 6 November 1998 of the Brussels Tribunal of First Instance on extradition 
request in respect of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. Ruling on Article 61 quinquies 5 C.L Cr· 
request for an instrument of supplementary preliminary investigation. Dossier 216/98. 
Notices 30.99.3447/98. 
35 For example. Belgium: Loi du 10 fevrier relative il la repression des violations graves du 
droit international humanitaire. Moniteur beIge 23 March 1999. Under the Canadian 
Criminal Code. Canadian couns have the jurisdiction to try and punish conduct commit· 
ted outside Canada at anv time if the conduct constitutes. in imernational law. a crime 
against humanity (Articl~ 57(3.71») Other examples include Bolivia. Brazil. Chile. Co· 
lombia. Costa Rica. Denmark. Ecuador, EI Salvador. France, Germany. Guatemala. Hon· 
duras. Israel. MexiCO, Nicaragua, Norway. Panama. Peru, Spain, Switzerland. Uruguay 
and Venezuela. See Amnesty International 1999a. 
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1992), Still another states: "every state may prosecute violations of fundamen-
tal norms of international law, particularly those relating to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity", The opposing view is that: "given that crimes against 
humanity are ergQ omnes, it foHows that all states. , . are under an obligation to 
prosecute and punish crimes against humanity and to cooperate in the detec-
tion. arrest, extradition and punishment of persons implicated in these crimes" 
(Amnesty International 1999a). 
With respect to war crimes committed in an internal armed conflict, 
while these crimes seem give rise to permissive universal jurisdiction. 
meaning that any state can prosecute them. either under its national 
implementing legislation or under customary international law, states do 
not appear to be under any international legal obligation to prosecute 
persons accused of committing such crimes, Article 6(5) of Protocol II 
provides that: "at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall 
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
participated in the armed conflict. or those deprived of their liberty for 
reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or 
detained". While it is clear from the travaux that this was never intended 
to apply to serious violations of the Protocol or to persons committing 
war crimes (Levie 1987:247). it still remains that "amnesty is a matter 
within the competence of the authorities" (Sandoz et al 1987:para. 
4617) While Article 6 of Protocol II leaves intact the right of national 
authorities to prosecute war crimes committed in an internal armed 
conflict. there does not appear to be any duty on states to prosecute, 
Therefore. states could conceivably grant amnesties in respect of war 
crimes committed in internal armed conflicts, since Protocol II does not 
forbid them from doing so, However, since states may claim universal 
jurisdiction over non-nationals who have committed serious violations of 
international humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts, 
even persons who may have legally been amnestied under national law 
could remain subject to prosecution by the courts of third states with the 
ability and inclination to prosecute them or by an international criminal 
tribunal." Thus. amnesties in respect of war crimes committed in an 
internal armed conflict occupy a sort of grey zone area; on the one 
hand, international law does not seem to prohibit states from granting 
them, on the other, individuals who have legally been amnestied can 
still be subject to prosecution under international law. In this respect, 
Article 6(5) of Protocol II is unsatisfactory in not specifying that war 
37 Some stares have undertaken criminal prosecutions against non·nationals for Violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in recent non-international armed con-
Flicts in third states. For example Switzerland, Germany, France, Denmark and Austria, 
In an important decision in November 1998, the :--:etherlands Supreme Court Found that 
the 1952 War Crimes Act. which makes punishable, inter alia. any violation of the laws 
and customs of war (without restriction to grave breaches)' could be "construed in such 
a way that its Anicie 3 establishes universal jurisdiction for violations of the laws and 
customs of war, including when the Netherlands is not a pany" to the armed conflict 
(Keijzer 1998:484). See also Prosecutor v Darko Knesevic. Hoge Raad Der Nederlanden 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
crimes cannot be amnestied, However, it will only be the case that war 
crimes committed in internal armed conflicts cannot be amnestied 
under national law when states are under an obligation aut dedere aut 
judicare in respect of them. 
5 STATE PRACTICE REGARDING AMNESTIES AND TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS 
If we look at state practice. we see that the amnesty and truth commis-
sion/commission of inquiry approach has frequently been the preferred 
(or rather, the only realistic) route for many states emerging from repres-
sion or from conflict, but that in all cases where prosecutions have not 
been undertaken and amnesties have been granted, some sort of alterna-
tive mechanism has been established, usually a truth commission and 
provision for reparations and compensation. Various different approaches 
have been adopted. 
One should distinguish between amnesties granted and truth commis-
sions established by Incoming democratic governments to investigate 
human rights abuses by the state. and those whose role it is to investigate 
violations of international humanitarian law, including and 
crimes against humanity, committed in the context of an armed conflict, 
whether international or internal in character. Most analyses of African 
and other states relate to the former. While the experiences of post-
repressive states may be instructive in analysing the experiences of post-
conflict states. one should be wary of drawing tOo many neat conclusions 
from the experiences of post-repressive states and trying to apply them to 
post-conflict states. The key differences relate to the nature of the crimes 
committed and the range of actors who can commit them, Where crimes 
committed by a state against its own population amount to 
crimes against humanity or genOCide, or where they involve crimes giving 
rise to a treaty obligation to prosecute or extradite, the of 
those states may be instructive for our purposes. On the other hand, as 
noted earlier, one must be careful to distinguish between human rights 
violations committed by states, and violations of international humani-
tarian law, which can be committed by either states or non-state actors. 
In Africa, two states stand out for taking a robust approach to violations 
of international humanitarian law - Rwanda and Ethiopia, The former is 
38 Proposed amendments to draft Article 10 (Article 6) of draft Protocol II by the Cornrnu-
nist block countries [hat a paragraph be included specifically providing. "Nothing in [he 
present Protocol shall be invoked to prevent the prosecution and punishment of per-
sons charged with crimes humanity or who participate in the conflict as foreign 
mercenaries". Another have provided: "None of the provisions of this Protocol 
may be used to prevent [he prosecution and punishment of persons accused of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity". However. these amendments were excluded 
from the final draft. See Levie 1987266 (CDDHII/260 24 March 1975 IV 34) and 270 
(CDDHII/GTl87). 
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discussed in the following section, The latter created, in 1992, an Office of 
the Special Prosecuwr to investigate and bring to trial persons suspected 
of having abused their pOSition in the government of Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, and a number of prosecutions have been undertaken (Shariff 
1996:96). 
in many other countries. however. amnesties have been granted and in 
some cases truth commissions have been established, In most cases. 
amnesty laws do not refer specifically to humanitarian law or human 
rights violations. nor do they specifically grant or exclude amnesties in 
respect of these types of crimes. Instead. the language used is broader 
and more ambiguous. with reference being made to "political crimes" or 
"military crimes" or "crimes agai nst the security of the state". without 
defining precisely which crimes are encompassed. or. which. if any. are 
excluded. The amnesty law adopted by Angola in 1996. for example. 
provided for amnesty "for all crimes against the internal security of the 
State and all related crimes committed by national citizens in the frame-
work of the armed conflict. beginning 31 May 1991 up to the date of 
approval of the present Law"." Article 2 also grants amnesty "for all 
military crimes committed in the referred period". The Sudan Peace 
Agreement Signed by the government and the rebels on 21 April 1997 
provided for a general amnesty to members of the South Sudan Defence 
Forces from any criminal or civil culpability relating to acts committed 
during the date of signing the peace accord. A joint amnesty commission 
was established to receive, examine and determine cases which are 
covered by this amnesty commission. 
In May 1986. the government of Yoweri Museveni in Uganda estab-
lished a Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights "to in-
quire into all aspects of violation of human rights, breaches of the rule of 
law and excessive abuse of powers" by the governments of Milton Obote 
and Idi Amin between 9 October 1962 and 25 January 1986."' lts report 
was published in 1994. 
In Zimbabwe, various amnesties have been granted over the years. and 
on two occasions. commissions of inquiries into past abuses have been 
established. However, these have not been full truth commissions and 
their finding have never been published (Shariff 1996:96). In Guinea, 
following the political transition in 1984, the incoming government 
avoided taking any action against former officials of the Sekou Toure 
regime (Shariff 1996:96) An amnesty law was also adopted in Benin 
following the political transition in 1990 and only a couple of trials of 
members of the former Mathieu Kerekou government have been under-
taken (Shariff 1996:96), In Mali. the need for reconciliation was also 
40 Available as a UN Doc 511996/340 8 May 1996 Article 1. 
41 Established under the Commissions of Inquiry Ace Legal Nmice (16 May 1986) (Cap. 
56) Publistled online at the website of [he United States Institute of Peace 
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stressed above all. following the overthrow of President Moussa Traore, 
who had held power for 23 years, although a few trials have been initi-
ated. Amnesties were also granted in the Congo, in 1991 and 1992, and 
no investigations in past human rights violations were undertaken. 
In Algeria, an amnesty law was adopted on 13 July 1999 in an effort to 
end the fractitious conflict which had terrorised the civilian population. 
The Law regarding the re-establishment of civil harmony' grants conces-
sions to persons implicated in terrorist or subversive acts, who convey 
their willingness to desist from further criminal acts. Chapter I, Article 2, 
provides that such persons shall benefit from either exoneration from 
punishment, the placing under probation, or the attenuation of penalties. 
However, the amnesty does not apply to persons who have been involved 
in murder, rape or bomb attacks on public areas. Moreover, those wishing 
to benefit from it had to swear allegiance to the state within six months of 
its taking effect. 
Following the overthrow of the Chadian dictator, Hissein Habre, the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed 
by Ex-President Habre, His Accomplices and/or Accessories was estab-
lished on 29 December 1990, under the chairmanship of the Chief Prose-
cutor, Mahamat Hassan Abakar. Its findings were published in May 1992. 
It found that the government had carried out 40 000 political killings and 
200 000 cases of torture, and that Mr Habre gave direct orders to single 
out certain groups of people (Human Rights Watch 2000). The crimes 
committed by Mr Habre's regime recently returned to the international 
spotlight when Habre, who had taken refuge in Senegal since his over-
throw in 1990, was arrested pursuant to an indictment on charges of 
torture. He is expected to be tried there later this year on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction. The case has widely been hailed as the first use of 
the so-called Pinochet precedent. A human rights group investigating the 
case documented 97 cases of political killings, 142 cases of torture and 
100 disappearances (Onishi 2000). The indictment against Habre was 
initiated by a group of his victims who are living in Senegal. International 
human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and the Interna-
tional Federation of Human Rights, have joined in the case. 
Nigeria is also beginning to come to terms with its past. On 4 June 
1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo appointed a commission to investi-
gate human rights abuses committed during the military regime between 
1 January 1994 and 29 May 1999. With the formal inauguration of the 
commission on 14 June 1999, this was extended to cover crimes commit-
ted from 31 December 1983. The commission's mandate is: 
"to ascertain or establish, to whatever extent the evidence and circumstances 
may permit, the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations or abuses 
and in particular all known or suspected cases of mysterious deaths and assassi-
nations or attempted assassinations committed in Nigeria since the last 
42 Loi 99-08 dLl 29 Rabi EI AOLlI 1420 correspondam all 13 juiller 19<)9 relative all retablis· 










































I A RIGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS 
democratic dispensation; to identify the person or persons, authorities, institu-
tions or organisations which may be held accountable for such mysterious 
deaths, assassinations or attempted assassinations or other violations or abuses 
of human fights, and to determine the motives for the violations or abuses. the 
Victims and circumstances thereof and effect on such victims or the 
, to determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of 
deliberate srate policy or the policy of any of its organs or institutions or indi-
viduals or their office or whether they were the acts of any political organisa-
tion, liberation movements or other group or individual: and to recommend 
measures which may be taken, whether judicial, administrative, legislative or 
institutional to redress past injustices and to prevent or forestall future viola-
tions or abuses of human rights", 
The commission's chairman has requested that the Government adopt 
enabling legislation to clarify the commission's status and powers, in-
cluding giving it subpoena powers, 
One cannot, however, draw any conclusions based on the experience of 
Africa alone. A deal of the practice in this area arises out of the 
experiences of South and Central American countries, coming to terms 
with a legacy of military repression. Amnesty laws were adopted and, in 
some cases, truth commissions or commissions of inquiry were estab-
lished in Argentina, Bolivia. Chile. Uruguay, Brazil. Peru. EI Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, inter alia. Of these countries, only EI 
Salvador, Guatemala. and Nicaragua can definitively be said to be internal 
armed conflicts, although there is argument over whether the situation in 
Chile during the military junta could be considered as an internal armed 
conflict." For reasons of limited space, we will thus confine ourselves to a 
brief discussion of the experiences of just these four countries, 
Following the end of the civil war, EI Salvador passed a series of am-
nesty decrees, one of which granted a general amnesty. with certain 
exceptions. It exempted persons convicted by juries (to cover certain 
officers convicted for the murder of Jesuit priests) and persons "who, 
according to the Truth Commission Report, may have participated in 
flagrant violence after January 1 of 1980. whose impact on society de-
mands with utmost urgency the public exposure of truth. regardless of the 
43 See website of US Institute for Peace' hup:liwww.usiporg! 
44 A Belgian Court recently found that (he situation in Chile 
Pinochet could not be considered [0 be an internal armed [Q which common 
Article 3 or Protocol II applied. (Decision of 6 November 1998 of the Brussels Tribunal 
of First Instance on extradition request in respect of AugustO Pinochet Ugarte. Ruling on 
Article 61 quinquies 5 c.l. Cr- request for an instrument of supplementary preliminary 
investigation. Dossier 216/98, Notices 30,99,3447/98) However. the Chilean Supreme 
Coun has found that the situation was an internal armed conflICt. (0 which common Ar-
ticle 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied. The court also invoked Article 146 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. which is normally applicable during international 
armed conflicts. Supreme Coun. 9 September 1998 469·98 concerning (he illegal 
detention of Pedro Poblete Cordova. Reprinted in TMC Asser [nstituut forthcoming 
1999, 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
perpetrators' role in society". To balance the amnesties. EI Salvador 
established a Truth Commis'sion in the Mexico of April 1991 
concluded between the government and the National Liberation Front and 
by virtue of the peace accords of 16 January 1992. The three,member 
commission was appointed by the UN to investigate 
"the most serious acts of violence" that had occurred since 1980. It was 
the first truth commission to include non-nationals and to have been 
empowered by the UN to investigate violations and make recommenda-
tions. The Commission began its work in July 1992 and had six months to 
submit its report. That report. From madness to hope: report of the CommIs-
sion on Truth for El Salvador contained far-reaching findings and recom-
mendations. resulting in the resignation from public office of several key 
government figures. 
After the release of the Truth Commission's report on 15 March 1993. 
President Cristiani addressed the nation and called for a general amnesty. 
On 20 March 1993. the Legislative Assembly the General Amnesty 
Law for the Consolidation of Peace." Article 1 a "full. absolute and 
unconditional amnesty (Q all those who participated in any way in the 
commission, prior to 1 January 1 of political crimes or common 
crimes linked (Q political crimes or common crimes in which the number 
of persons Involved is no less than twenty". The law also provided that it 
extends to those persons referred to in Decree 147. The definition of 
"political crimes" included "crimes against the public peace". "crimes 
against the activities of the courts". and crimes "committed on the occa-
sion of or as a consequence of the armed conflict". In addition to protec-
tion from criminal liability. the "amnesty granted by this law cancels civil 
responsibility in all instances". As already noted. the Salvadoran amnesty 
was declared illegal by the Inter-American Commission in 1 992 and 
1994.47 
The Peace Agreement in Guatemala, signed on 29 December 1996 by 
the Guatemalan government and the National Guatemalan Revolutionary 
Unit (URNG) was harshly criticised for encouraging impunity, because it 
provided for an amnesty for crimes committed by both sides during the 
36-year civil war, including political crimes such as sedition. illicit associa-
tion. crimes against the security of the states. and weapons-related 
crimes. However, it specifies that no amnesty can be granted for crimes 
that are criminaJised by international treaties. The National Reconciliation 
Law. adopted by the Congress on 18 December 1996, states that while 
clearly political crimes are exempt from prosecution, serious human rights 
violations are nor. Article 8 provides that the amnesty "will not be appli-
cable to crimes of genOCide, torture and forced disappearances. as well as 
to those crimes for which a statute of limitation does not apply (this would 
potentially include crimes humanity) or those for which the extinc-
tion of the criminal responsibility cannot be admitted in accordance with 
46 Decree 486 










































A RIGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOCS VIOLATIONS 
the Guatemalan internal legislation or the international treaties ratified by 
Guatemala". The law makes no mention of exemption of any of the 
amnestied crimes from civil liability. A Comprehensive Agreement on 
Human Rights was signed on 29 March 1994. 
Guatemala established the Historical Clarification Commission on 
23 June 1994 as part of the peace process, Its mandate was to investigate 
human rights violations during the war."' The purposes of the commission 
were: 
"I. To claflfy with all objectivity, equity and impaniallty the human rights viola-
tions and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suf-
fer. connected with the armed confliCt. 
II. To prepare a report that will contain the findings of the investigations car-
ried out and provide objective information regarding events during this period 
covering all factOrs, internal as well as external. 
III. To formulate specific recommendations to encourage peace and national 
harmony in Guatemala. The Commission shall recommend, in particular, 
measures to preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mutual 
respect and observance of human rights and to strengthen the democratic pro-
cess." 
The Commission could receive particulars and information from: 
'" individuals or institutions that consider themselves to be affected and 
also from the Parties 
II. The Commission shall be responsible for clarifying these situations fully and 
in detail. In particular, it shall analyse the factors and circumstances involved in 
those cases with complete impartiality. The Commission shall Invite those who 
may be in possession of relevant information to submn their version of the 
incidents. Failure of those concerned to appear shall not prevent the Commis-
sion from reaching a determination on the cases. 
III. The CommiSSion shall not attribute responSibility to any Individual in its 
work, recommendations and report nor shall these have any judicial aim or 
affect. 
IV. The Commission's proceedings shall be confidential so as to guarantee the 
secrecy of the sources and the safety of witnesses and informants. 
V. Once it is established, the Commission shall publicize the fact that it has 
been establIshed and the place where it IS meeting by all possible means, and 
shall invite interested to present their information and their testimony." 
On 26 February \999, the truth commission published its report:" The 
Commission for Historical Clarification was established through the accord 
of Oslo on 23 June 1994 to clarify the history of the events of more than 
48 Agreement 011 the establishment of the commission [0 past human 
Violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population [0 
Published online at the website of the United States Institute of Peace, 
Impwww.usip.orgl. Truth Commissions: Charters: Guatemala. Also available online at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/minugua/paz6.ht m. 
49 Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio. Available online at 
hnpllhrdata.aaas.orglcehiindex.htmi (Spanish only). An English language summary is 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
three decades of war. Rather than Focusing on individual criminal respon-
sibility, it looked at institutional responsibility, particularly of the Guate-
malan state and armed forces but also of the rebels and outside Forces, 
including the US. The report concluded that an estimated 200 000 people 
were killed or disappeared, State Forces were responsible For 93 per cent 
of the violations documented, the guerrillas for three per cent. Eighty-
three per cent of the victims were Mayan. Most importantly, the repon 
found that agents of the state of Guatemala committed genocide against 
the Mayan people during counterinsurgency operations, and that these 
acts were not investigated or punished by Guatemala, despite its obliga-
tions under the Genocide Convention. Finally, the report proposed a 
Guatemalan presidential commission to purge the military of human 
rights violators and called for justice in connection with crimes excepted 
from the 1996 Amnesty Law. 
Law 81 on General Amnesty and National Reconciliation was adopted in 
Nicaragua in March 1990. It provided for a: 
"general and unconditional amnesty law for all Nicaraguans, with no distinc-
tions made for particular class. The Presidential decree specified that amnesty 
IS granted to '[alII who committed crimes against the public 
order and the internal external security of the State. and other related acts' 
as well as 'al! civilian and military Nicaraguans who may have committed in-
fractions in the course of carrying out or investigating the criminal acts de-
scribed' During the administration of President Chamorro, the National 
Assembly passed a law that revoked the amnesty in Law No. 81, but granted an 
amnesty to anyone for 'political crimes or common crimes related 
to them' committed at any time prior to the passage of this law" (Graditzky 
199829) 
Chile's incoming democratic government in 1990, led by President Ayl-
win, inherited a law which the military had granted itself in 
1978. Conscious of the fragile political situation and the likelihood of a 
military coup. Aylwin did not call the amnesty law into question, In May 
1990, a truth and reconciliation commission was established, by execu-
tive order of 25 April 1990, with the goal of getting a picture of the serious 
abuses that had occurred. It was strictly a non-judicial body, and could not 
determine individual criminal responsibility, but it could recommend 
measures of compensation and legal measures to be taken to avoid future 
violations. The commission's 2 000 page report, known as the 'Renig 
Report', was presented in February 1991 (Chilean National Commission 
on Truth and Reconciliation 1993), A summarised version was made 
available and widely distributed as part of an educational campaign aimed 
at promoting awareness of what had happened in Chile. In January 1992, 
a law was passed to create a National Corporation for Compensation and 
Reconciliation, with a two-year mandate to encourage moral and material 
compensation (such as pensions, health and educational grants) to victims 
and their families (Shariff 1996:96). 
50 Decree 2.191 of 1978. Arricle 1 granted an amnesty to all persons who had taken parr 










































A RIGHT TO TRUTH. JUSTICE &. A REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS 
There have been some prosecutions in Chile' but most of the military 
Junta has never been tried. However, the story has not quite ended in the 
cosy retirement that the Chilean generals counted on. The case of General 
Pinochet shows that amnesties apparently legal under national law may 
have no international legal currency and are no safeguard against interna-
tional prosecution. At the time of writing, General Pinochet. who was 
arrested in London in October 1998 pursuant to a Spanish arreSt warrant, 
had been returned to Chile by the United Kingdom on medical grounds. 
and it was not clear if he would be tried in Chile. A major obstacle will be 
the 1978 Amnesty Law. However, a decision of Chile's Supreme Court of 
1998 regarding the legality of the 1978 self-amnesty law gives some cause 
for optimism. The legality of that self-amnesty decreed in 1978 to all 
persons who have taken part in punishable offences between J I Septem-
ber 1973 and 10 March 1978 during the regime of General Augusto 
Pinochet, was examined by the Chilean Supreme Court. The appellant 
challenged the amnesties. claiming. inter alia, that they infringed Chile's 
obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law con-
ventions. 
The majority of the coun found that the Higher Military Court of Santiago 
had erred in its decision to dismiss the case with prejudice on the grounds 
that the penal liability of the accused had been extinguished by the grant 
of amnesty. The Chilean judicial system is founded on the investigation of 
the facts alleged in criminal accusations: 
"Consequently, the penal procedure in the case of crime or simple misde-
meanor aims in the First stage of the summary to determine the punishable fact 
and the person who committed it. To grant amnesty. the person who 
committed the crime must be uneqUivocally Identified, because that is the only 
way that penal action for his part In the crime can be stopped .... by applying 
a ground of termination of penal liability, that does not have the power to de-
cide the case, the judges ... have violated Justice." 
The Court determined that the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular. 
common Article 3, was applicable in Chile at the relevant time and noted 
that it compels the partaking nations in the case of an internal armed 
conflict to the use of humane treatment. including those who have laid 
down their arms, and forbids attempts on life, or bodily integrity or 
attacks on personal dignity 
"Under the terms of the Convention, the state of Chile has undertaken to guaran-
tee the of those who might have taken part in armed conflicts within the 
territory, especially if they have been taken prisoner, while it remains forbidden 
to use means to conceal the offences that have been committed against certain 
persons or even to get exemption from pUnishment for the oFfenders. whilst 
keeping in mind that international agreements should be executed in good faith. 
Under these circumstances, not applying aforementioned provisions brings 
51 Since 1994 there have been about 20 convictions (Shariff 1996:96). 
52 See footnote 28. 
53 According to the appellam: "These texts have constitutional primacy according to [he 
amendment of art 5 of the Constitution of the Republic and take precedence over Ihe 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
about a violation of the law, that must be put right through this appeal. in par-
ticular if it is kept in mind that to the principles of international law, 
international treaties must be and executed in good faith. From this it 
may be deduced that internal law must itself to these and the legislator 
must assimilate the new norms as laid in these international instruments. He may 
not infringe on its principles, without first denouncing the treaty" 
6 SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa's Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
adopted as a means of dealing with the crimes of apanheid and attempt-
ing to move beyond that legacy, was an unpleasant medicine for many 
victims of apartheid. The Act provided for the establishment of a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and reparations and rehabilitation to 
victims, but it prevented victims or their relatives from pursuing criminal 
or Civil suits against perpetrators who had been granted amnesty (Sarkin 
1996; 1997; 1998) The widow of Steve Biko, one of South Africa's most 
prominent anti-apartheid activists, applied to the Constitutional Court in 
an attempt to prevent the TRC from beginning its work. "The amnesty 
procedure of the commission", she said, "was denying her constitutional 
right to justice by indemnifying her husband's murderers against standing 
trial" (Mrs Biko's dilemma 1997) 
As is well known, the Constitutional Court found against her. 
"The Court accepted the South African Government's argument that only an 
offer of amnesty would draw apartheid murderers out of the woodwork. With 
the TR.C. Mrs Biko might not get but at least she would get the truth. 
Without the TRe she would get neither as evidenced by the fact that three 
separate inquests had failed, previously, to identify Biko's killers" (Mrs Biko's 
dilemma 1997) 
The case of Mrs Biko neatly illustrates the conundrum facing states with a 
legacy of human rights or humanitarian law abuses: the best guarantee of 
a peaceful transition may sometimes be to overlook some of the crimes of 
the past. While this may be in the interests of the as a whole, for 
individual victims it may mean justice denied. 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, provided for 
in the 1995 Act. was established in ! 996 and was composed of 17 
members appointed by the President to establish, by means of public 
hearings and investigations, a complete picture of the "gross violations 
of human rights" committed between 1960 and 1993; to facilitate the 
granting of amnesty; to restore the dignity of victims by providing them 
with an opportunity to testify publicly; to grant reparations to the vic-
tims; and to write a report documenting the abuses, including recom-
mendations to prevent such violations in future. The TRC was composed 
54 Au 34 of 1995. 
55 The Azanian People's OrganisatIOn (Azapa) v The President of the Republic of South 










































A RIGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS 
of three committees: the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation: 
the Committee on Amnesty, and the Committee on Human Rights 
Violations. 
The tasks of the Reparation and Reconciliation Committee (RRC) were 
to find out what harm the victims of gross human rights abuses suffered 
and what the effects were on their families and dependants: to provide 
emotional support for victims and witnesses, before. during and after 
hearings; to consult communities and individuals about the impact of 
violations on their lives and possible ways of achieving reparation and 
rehabilitation; to make recommendations to the President and Parliament 
for urgent assistance in cases where immediate relief was needed; and to 
recommend to the President what type of reparation should be made and 
ways to prevent similar human rights violations in future (TRC no date: 1-
2) 
According to the RRC, "'Reparation and rehabilitation' is a term for 
what can be done to assist victims to restore the damage that victims 
have suffered, to give them back their dignity and to make sure that these 
abuses do not happen again. Although this could include compensation, a 
financial payment is not the only form of reparation and rehabilitation 
that the Committee will recommend. The Committee will look at individu-
als. communities and the nation as a whole when making recommenda-
tions to achieve reparation and rehabilitation' (TRC no 
The RRC focused on people who were victims of gross human rights 
abuses or crimes which were committed within a political context be-
tween 1 March 1960 and 5 December 1993. Victims are people who were 
killed, abducted, tortured or severely ill-treated; and family members or 
dependents of a person who was killed or who disappeared. The RRC had 
the power only to make recommendations to the President; it could not 
itself decide what to do. Its recommendations were in the report sent to 
the President after the TRC had completed its work. 
The South African TRC, cognisant of the fact that for many victims it 
would be too long to wait until the publication of the TRes final report. 
developed legislation that would enable victims to receive interim repara-
tions and rehabilitation. The nature of urgent interim relief envisaged 
were: social assistance, pensions or disability grants; medical care and 
assistance; material or financial need and limitations; access to and con-
tinuation of education; and the duty and obligation to remember victims 
or events through symbolic measures and intervention. The symbolic 
interventions for people who were terminally ill. for example, would 
include clearing of victims' names, especially those with criminal records 
or those considered to be informants; settling legal procedures and issuing 
death certificates. 
Victims could not apply directly to the RRC. "Instead, the Committee 
[found] out who the victims are and what their needs are by receiving 
reports from the other two Committees; and not every victim is entitled to 
interim relief. The Committee will only recommend this relief where there 
is an urgent need which cannot wait until the Commission has completed 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Victims could write, visit, phone or fax the TRC. The TRC would arrange 
for a statement to be taken, which would then be sent to the Committee 
on Human Rights Violations. If that committee found that someone was a 
victim, it included his or her name in the report sent to the RRC. Repara-
tions would only be finalised after the TRC finished its work. In April 
1997, the TRC unveiled plans to pay more than R3-billion to people who 
suffered human rights violations during the apartheid era, on the recom-
mendations of the RRC. The RRC Commissioner said that they were 
obliged in terms of international treaties and TRC legislation to give vic-
tims adequate compensation to make a "meaningful and substantial 
impact on their lives".c-
The work of the Amnesty Committee was the most controversial and 
high profile of that carried out by the TRC. The Act enabled the TRC to 
grant amnesties to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant 
facts. Amnesty could only be sought for gross human rights violations 
committed with a political motive. The criteria to be employed for decid-
ing whether the act was one "associated with a political objective" are 
drawn from the principles used in extradition law for deciding whether 
the offence in respect of which extradition is sought is a political offence. 
The criteria include, inter alia, the motive of the offender; the context in 
which the act took place and, in particular, whether it was committed "in 
the course of or as part of a political uprising, disturbance or event"; the 
gravity of the act; the objective of the act, and in particular, whether it 
was "primarily directed at a political opponent or state property or per-
sonnel or against private property or individuals"; and the relationship 
between the act and the political objective pursued, "in particular the 
directness and proximity of the relationship and the proportionality of the 
act to the objective pursued". One could argue that crimes against hu-
manity are never a proportionate means of achieving a particular political 
end, and the same could surely be said of genocide, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Convention and apartheid. The range of crimes which can be 
considered as political crimes has narrowed conSiderably in recent years. 
Serious violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes 
against humanity and war crimes are not considered political crimes for 
the purposes of extradition or for exclusion under Article 1 (f) of the Refu-
gee Convention. A person granted amnesty shall not be criminally or 
civilly liable in respect of the act in question." 
As of 9 December 1998, the Amnesty Committee had received 7 124 
applications from perpetrators of violations." Where crimes were commit-
ted with political motivation, but there were no gross human rights 
abuses, the amnesty application could be assessed by looking at docu-
mentation. However, where there were human rights violations like 
56 Give apartheid victims R3b says the TRC 1997 The Star 4 April: 1. 
57 S 20 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. 











































A RlGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE & A REMEDY FOR AFRlCAN VICTIMS OF SERlOUS VIOLi\TIONS 
murder, [Orture, abduction or severe ill treatment for instance, there had 
to be a public hearing in which dependants of the victim/s had to be 
invited and were entitled to oppose amnesty if they chose, In fact, any 
interested party could oppose amnesty, After J a months of hearings, 
however, the TRC started to hear some submissions in camera. According 
to the deputy chairperson of the TRe 
"The reasoning behind the decision to hold in camera hearings is that many 
people would then be more willing to share information with the Commission. 
This way they do not have to fear the possibie consequences or even have their 
colleagues know that they have shared this information .. The CommisSion 
has the discretion of disclosing the information received in these closed hear-
ings" (Truth Talk. 1996) 
Both applicants for amnesty and their victims were entitled to legal repre-
sentation at these hearings. Where the hearings were open, they were 
televised and well-attended, and the proceedings of the TRC were fol-
lowed closely in the media. 
In order to arrive at the truth, it was not enough for perpetrators to con-
fess. Confessions had to be corroborated, and the TRC could conduct 
investigations. This is also true of victims' statements, which had to be 
confirmed before victims could qualify for reparation and rehabilitation, 
While the TRC followed a process of voluntary submissions, it also had the 
power to subpoena people and to search for and seize materials where 
they were not readily available. 
There has been no direct relationship between the amnesty system and 
the South African judicial system: the Amnesty Committee does not refer 
anything to courts and the courts do not refer anything to the committee. 
However, when appropriate, the Amnesty Committee can have access to 
court records. For instance, where an applicant is someone who has been 
tried and convicted by a court, it may be necessary to have access to the 
court records in order to assess their applications. Those in respect of 
whom amnesty is denied, and those who have not applied for amnesty, 
are liable to prosecution. Some prosecutions have already been under-
taken. 
The Committee on Human Rights was established on 16 December 
1995. Its function was [0 try and establish a complete picture of the gross 
human rights violations that had been committed. Public meetings were 
held throughout the country to explain the committee's work. Ten months 
into the process, because of the vast number of people who wanted to 
make statements but could not be accommodated through the hearings 
process, the TRC decided to reduce the number of hearings and concen-
trate resources on raking statements (Truth Talk 1996). The committee: 
"devised a form, referred to as a 'protocol' or 'statement form', for recording 
the statements made to the Commission by people who believed that had 
suffered gross violations of human rights, It appointed and trained 'statement 
takers' to listen to the accounts related by such persons. and to record them in 
a manner which would facilitate their entry into the Commission's database 
For thousands of people, statement takers represented their first and often their 
only face-to-face encounter with the Commission" (TRC 1998 vol 5 chapter 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Victims who gave statements received written acknowledgement and 
thanks for having made them (TRC 1998 vol 5 chapter I :para, 39), The 
work of the South African TRC lasted for two and a half years, In fact, the 
commission has still not finished its work, as the Amnesty Committee is 
still processing the more than 7000 claims that were submitted. The 
other committees completed their tasks on 31 October 1998, and a final 
report was presented to President Nelson Mandela on 29 October 1998. 
The final report of the Truth Commission is a mammoth piece of work. 
consisting of five volumes. An additional volume will be added once the 
Amnesty Committee completes its report. Volume 2, following an intro-
ductory volume I, documents the human rights violations carried out in 
South Africa between 1960 and 1990 and the political situation during 
that period. Volume 3 addresses the position of the victim. Volume 4 
takes a wider look at the nature of the society in which the violations 
occurred. Volume 5 contains the conclusions and recommendations of the 
TRC. 
The report is obviously too voluminous to attempt any son of an evalua-
tion. However. some points are worth noting. The TRC Report names 
individuals, institutions and organisations: the State President at the time, 
FW de Klerk was condemned for his role in the facilitation of gross human 
rights violations; Winnie Madikizela-Mandela was found responsible for 
committing gross violations of human rights; the African National Con-
(ANC); the organs of state, the media, the judiCiary, the health sector 
and a wide range of others are all identified and responsibility is attributed 
to them. 
As the final report documents, acts such as torture and severe ill treat-
ment, assassinations and killings could qualify as political crimes and be 
amnestied. This, however, seems to be in contravention of international 
law. Even if South Africa was not a party to the Torture Convention at the 
relevant time, torture is a crime under customary international law. While 
there is a proportionality test. as one commentator notes, "any sort of 
proportionality test raises the question of how a gross human rights 
violation, such as torture, could be proportional to the objective being 
pursued" (Parker 1996:7). South Africa endeavoured to avoid running into 
the tricky problem of apartheid as a crime giving rise to an obligation aut 
dedere aut judicare by limiting the TRC's mandate to crimes "which ema-
nated from the conflicts of the past, rather than from the policies of 
apartheid" (TRC 1998 vol 5 chapter I: para 48). This meant that the TRC 
could avoid having to consider amnesties for what were strictly speaking 
apartheid crimes. But this results in a very artificial distinction being 
drawn. Most of the crimes were committed precisely because of apart-
heid; indeed, it was apartheid that, for the perpetrators acting on the 
government side, provided the political motivation. For the sake of pro-
viding a fuller understanding of the underlying causes of particular crimes. 
the TRC should have been able to examine apartheid policies and the idea 
of apartheid itself. That would. however, have potentially put the TRC in a 
legally difficult situation. Even without the inclusion of apartheid. how-
ever, one can question whether many of the crimes which qualified for 










































I A RIGHT TO TRUTH. JUSTICE & t\ REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS I 
The amnesties were subject to challenge in the Azapo case, men-
tioned previously. Dugard notes that the Constitutional Court, called upon 
to examine the applicability of international law within the South African 
legal system and the place of customary international law in municipal 
law, did not rise to the challenge: 
"It might have been expected that the Court would have examined 
the conventional and customary rules that appeared to prosecution of 
human rights violators. the practice of other states in transition and finally 
whether the drafters of the Intenm Constitution Intended to overrule interna-
tional law on the subject of amnesty. Cnfonunately this was not done. The 
Court considered only the question whether the proviSions of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions requiring prosecution for 'grave breaches' were applicable (whiCh 
it held were not applicable to the South African Situation). but made no attempt 
to examine whether the customary law rules relating to torture. war 
crimes and crimes against humanity required prosecution of of-
fenders. As apartheid been labelled a crime agamst humanity the GA 
it is surprising that no attempt was made to address the question whether cus-
tomary international law reqUires the prosecution of those who commit this 
crime, particularly in respect of systematic murder. torture and disappearances 
which were crimes under South African law before 1990. State practice IS like-
wise given inadequate attention." (Dugard 199790-91) 
The Court took the view that international law was relevant only in the 
interpretation of the Constitution. But. as Dugard points out. while the 
Constitution and other legislation is presumed to accord with international 
law, 
"this requires a court of law first to ascertain the rule of law of international law 
in a thorough and proper manner and. secondly, to attempt to reconcile it with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Only when this has been done can the 
court consider the question of conSistency. In Azapo. however, the Court ap-
pears to have proceeded from the assumption that international law was irrele-
vant if it was inconsistent with the Constitution. instead of attempting first to 
reconCile the two before considering the question of inconsistency." (Dugard 
1997:90-91) 
By failing to consider the position of international law on the question of 
amnesties, the court demonstrated disregard for the principles of interna-
tional law, a particularly unfortunate stance for a court in the new South 
Africa to take. 
While the TRC Report did not attempt to identify the nature of the con-
flicts in southern African from the perspective of international humani-
tarian law, it indicated that it was guided by the principles of international 
humanitarian law, although it did not qualify the violations committed 
during the course of the conflicts as breaches of international humanitar-
ian law but as violations of human rights: 
"In cases where the Commission could not determine whether a combatant 
was out of combat, and therefore regarded as a protected person, it followed 
the precedent set by international humanitarian law. The commission gave the 
benefit of the doubt to people killed or seriously in uncertain circum-
stances and found them to be the victims of gross violations of human rights" 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
Significantly, the report, while noting the distinction between international 
and internal armed conflicts, and between grave breaches and common 
Article 3 breaches, stated: "This distinction between international and 
internal armed conflicts is Jess relevant today, as the laws of war have 
evolved to regulate more closely the use of force in all situations of armed 
conflict". 
The com mission made findings on specific incidents, such as the attack 
on the Kassinga refugee camp in 1978, describing this as the commission 
of gross human rights violations against the civilian occupants of Kassinga 
camp by reason of the use of fragmentation bombs in the initial air as-
sault which constituted an indiscriminate use of force, and the failure to 
take adequate care to protect the lives of civilians. The language speaks of 
humanitarian law violations although there is no reference to violations of 
humanitarian law. 
The reason for the TRes reluctance to qualify the crimes as interna-
tional humanitarian law violations may be explained by its view that 
international humanitarian law violations was of itself inadequate to 
address all the problems which it had to deal with. "The Commission 
found the Geneva Conventions and its various protocols to be of great 
assistance, but believes that there is still more that could be added" (TRC 
1998 vol 5:348). This does not answer the question whether humanitarian 
law was applicable. Even if humanitarian law did not cover all the situa-
tions arising, it would still apply, as well as human rights law, and it is 
unfortunate that the TRC did not qualify the crimes as breaches of hu-
manitarian law in addition to their being gross human rights violations. 
The same acts could indeed have been both and by avoiding qualifying 
certain acts as humanitarian law violations or apartheid crimes, South 
Africa has attempted to circumvent its imernational legal obligations. 
The TRC process has other shortcomings. According to the then-
Minister of Justice Dullah Omar: 
the perpetrators of apartheid crimes have not been as forthcoming as they 
should have been.. . When applying for amnesty, there is a concern that a 
number of perpetrators of very senous crImes, come along to the TRe with 
a view to obtaining amnesty and show very little emotion, very little comrition, 
very lIttle regret. and one would have hoped that the humanity and generosity 
displayed by victims wollid be matched by some degree of contrition on the 
pan of the perpetrators"'· 
Other bodies have been established to investigate other parts of the story. 
The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Allegations of Cruelty and Hu-
man Rights Abuses Against ANC Prisoners and Detainees by ANC Mem-
bers was established in January 1993 to investigate abuses in detention 
camps by the ANC in Angola, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Its report 
was issued on 23 August 1993. 
59 Statement made on 'Facing the Past International Criminal Tribural for 
(ICTX), Newshour with Jim Lehrer. Online Focus. Transcript April 










































A RIGHT TO TRUTH, JUSTICE &A REMEDY FOR AFRICAN VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS I 
7 RWANDA 
Rwanda has had to cope with crimes committed on an even larger scale 
and with consequences that were even more devastating. Estimates put 
the number killed in the genocide at between 500 000 and one million." 
Particularly chilling is the manner in which the entire state apparatus was 
committed to the goal of genocide and the widespread participation of the 
civilian population. 
Although the international community was not able to prevent or stop 
the genocide. in 1994, it established the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda. a sister tribunal to the ICTY. The tribunal has jurisdiction over 
crimes against humanity. genocide and violations of common Article 3 
and Protocol II. The work of the tribunal has received some scholarly 
attention.' although nothing compared with that shown the ICTY. We will 
not consider the tribunal here. confining ourselves to a brief examination 
of the response shown by Rwanda itself to the genocide. 
Faced with the complete collapse of its judicial system. Rwanda has had 
to build a new one from scratch. Judges and prosecutors must be trained. 
courtrooms built. dossiers compiled and an entire infrastructure con-
structed. Time is not on the side of the Rwandans; many suspects lan-
guish in terrible conditions of detention without being charged or without 
being aware of the charges against them. The Rwandan government 
changed the law to retrospectively validate detentions. Because of the 
need to speed things up. prosecutors and judges receive scant training. 
and individuals with four months' training can preside over death-penalty 
cases. In 1998. almost 130000 individuals were in detention. pending 
trial. but even allowing for ways to make trials more expeditiOUS. it will 
take decades to try everyone. if that is the intention. Recognising the 
problem. in 1996 the government adopted the Organic Law of August 30. 
1996 on the organisation of prosecutions for offences constituting the 
crime of genOCide or crimes against humanity since I October 1990. 
which entered into force on I September 1996.04 The Organic Law pro-
vides for a system of plea-bargains for lesser crimes as well as introducing 
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes into the 
Rwandan legal system. The law divides the crimes committed into four 
categories: Category one includes all the planners. organisers, leaders. 
instigators. persons in positions of power or authority and perpetrators of 
sexual torture. Persons accused of these crimes are not entitled to any 
reduction of sentence and are subject to the death penalty. On 
30 November, the Attorney-General of the Supreme Court, pursuant to 
60 See Sarkin 1999: 767. 
61 See Segui 1994 para. 57. 
62 See for example Cisse 1998: 161: Shraga & Zacklin 1996:501. L.ee 1996:37. 
63 The Law 9/96 of 8 September 1996 relaling [0 provisional modifications [0 (he Criminal 
Procedure Code entered into force retroactively being effective from 6 April 1994. 
64 See footnote 3 
65 The penal code of Rwanda adopted on 18 August 1977 does not list and 
crimes against humanity. bw a draft law is expected [0 be adopted in 
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Article 9 of the Law, published a list containing 1 946 persons who fell 
into category one. If. after publication of this list, a person confessed, he 
or she would be put into category two, regardless of the nature of the 
crime.' Category two includes persons who are the "perpetrators or 
accomplices of intentional homicide" or suspected of serious assaults 
resulting in death. Perpetrators who confess and enter a guilty plea before 
prosecution will receive a sentence of seven to eleven years' imprison-
ment, while persons confessing after prosecution are liable for lIto 15 
years' imprisonment. Persons in category two not confessing and being 
found gUilty are liable to life imprisonment. 
Category three includes persons accused of serious assaults. If they 
plead guilty before prosecution, their sentence will be reduced by two-
thirds. If they plead guilty after prosecution, their sentence will be halved. 
Category four includes persons who have committed property crimes. 
Importantly, once a plea-bargain has been entered, the perpetrator has 
to apologise to the victim." "Such an act of apology must be understood 
as a full component and condition of national reconciliation" (Cisse 
1998: I 80-181) 
Genocide and crimes against humanity are to be tried in special courts 
created for the purpose by the Organic Law.''' Military personnel sus-
pected of genOCide or crimes against humanity are to be tried by Military 
Courts if they are high-ranking and by law counsels if they are rank and 
file. 
Significantly, the 1996 law allows civil parties to appear in court to ob-
tain compensation for damages resulting from the genOCide. Under Article 
32, the victims have a right to compensation. Another law provides for 
interim assistance to needy victims. Under the OrganiC Law, while 
perpetrators can be held civilly liable for their particular Victims, they are 
also held responsible vis-a-vis all the victims of the genOCide. 
There have also been other attempts to probe events in Rwanda, in-
cluding the UN Commission of Inquiry for Rwanda, which preceded the 
establishment of the ICTR. In 1992, four NGOs namely the International 
Federation of Human Rights, Africa Watch, the Inter African Union for 
Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples and the International Centre for 
the Rights of the Individual and the Development of Democracy, created 
the International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations 
in Rwanda since I October 1990. Comprised of ten members from eight 
countries, the commission reported its findings in March 1993 based on 
66 journal qgiciel special edition 30 November 1996 
67 Article 6(b) 
68 Article 19 
69 Law 02ICJ8 of 22 January 1998. 
70 Under Article 30ll)' "convicted persons whose acts place them in Category I under 
Article 2 shall be held JOintly and severally liable tor all damages caused in the country 
by their acts of criminal participation, regardless of where the offences were commit, 
ted". In contrast. offenders falling into the other are only liable "For damages 
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investigations of civilian deaths during Rwanda's civil war beginning in 
October 1990. Africa Watch distributed the Commission's final report. 
8 SIERRA LEONE 
At the opposite end of the scales of justice, for Sierra Leone, an end to the 
eight and a half year old war has come at a very high complete 
impunity for all the rebels and government soldiers. The Lome Peace 
Agreement. signed on 7 July 1999, not only allows a complete and uncondi-
tional pardon and blanket amnesty to all combatants and collaborators in 
respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives up to the 
signing of the present agreement.
7
: but also grants eight positions in gov-
ernment and the vice-presidency to the rebels. No criminal or civil pro-
ceedings are to be taken against perpetrators of serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. although a Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission is to be established. "to address impunity, break the cycle of vio-
provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human 
rights violations to tell their story to a clear picture of the past in order to 
facilitate genuine healing"'" 
This seems like a very ambitious programme for a body that is hamstrung 
from the start by the fact that perpetrators have no incentive to testify 
before it. While it may offer victims some opportunity to relate their experi-
ences in a sympathetic and authoritative environment, and for their stories 
to be recorded, it will be hard for the commission, for example. to get a 
clear picture of what happened without hearing from the perpetrators. It 
can construct a mosaic of victims' stories, but there will be no getting to the 
foundational causes of the conflict. Without this, the commission will have 
only a limited role in facilitating genuine healing. It is also hard to imagine 
how it can address impunity considering that its very existence is owed to 
impunity. Impunity is a fact in Sierra Leone. and the truth commission is 
not capable of addressing the impunity that now exists, although it may 
consider how to prevent such situations arising in the future. 
While perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law 
would appear to be getting off scot-free in Sierra Leone, they should not rest 
too easy. The international community has suggested that it might consider 
sening up an International Criminal Tribunal with jurisdiction over the 
crimes committed in Sierra Leone. When the UN special representative for 
Sierra Leone. Francis Okelo, signed the peace agreement. he made an oral 
disclaimer that the amnesties did not apply to crimes against humanity, 
genOCide war crimes and other serious violations of international humani-
tarian law. 
71 Lome Peace Agreement Anicle IX. See footnote 4. 
72 Article IV of the Lome Peace Agreement enables members of the RUF/SL to hold public 
office: Article V grams the memioned positions. 
73 Article XXVI, Human Rights Violations 
74 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated «I instructed my special representative to sign the 
agreement with the explicit provisio that the United Nations holds the understanding that the 
amnesty and pardon in article IX of the agreement shall not apply ro international crimes of 
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Pending the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal, if that 
ever happens, an International Commission of Inquiry will be established. 
On 6 August J 999, Mary Robinson named an expert to study the link 
between a truth and reconciliation body in Sierra Leone and a possible 
(international) Commission of Inquiry. Bethuel Kiplagat of Kenya was 
appointed 
"to prepare an in-depth report. based on consultations with all concerned, on 
the nexus between a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Commission 
of Inquiry, and the possible future role of the latter, and to submit recommen-
dations to the High Commissioner, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General and the Secretary-General of the United Nations". 
It is to be expected that, if established, an international commission of 
inquiry would work in co-operation and co-ordination with a national truth 
commission. But one cannot really imagine what the function of such a 
commiSSion of inquiry might be, other than as an information-gathering 
mechanism with a view to future prosecutions, But unless the commission 
has the power to subpoena witnesses, few perpetrators will volunteer to 
give evidence to it if it might be used as evidence before any international 
criminal court. Thus, we may end up with a fuller picture of events from 
the victims' side, It is also important that any international commission of 
inquiry does not undermine the work and role of the national body. 
In Sierra Leone, as in South Africa, serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, including crimes giving rise to an obligation to prose-
cute or extradite, have been committed, In both instances. they have 
been subject to an amnesty, although the Sierra Leonean one is com-
pletely undiscriminating, whereas the South African one is at least 
subject to certain conditions Even in South Africa, though, violations of 
humanitarian law have probably been subsumed under the umbrella of 
political crimes. In Sierra Leone, the number of crimes which have been 
forgotten is potentially vast, and Sierra Leone has made no attempt to 
distinguish between crimes giving rise to international obligations and 
lesser crimes, or even to invoke the political crime exception. At least in 
relation to crimes against humanity, it may be in violation of interna-
tional law by not prosecuting or punishing persons accused of commit-
ting them, Sierra Leone, however, incurs no penalties for its violation, In 
a sense, being a sovereign state, it is free to adopt any law it wants, at 
least under its national law, But Sierra Leone also has obligations ariSing 
under international law, and being a party to certain international con-
ventions, it is obliged to incorporate their proVisions into its national 
law. If it does nor do so, it is in violation of international law, Further-
more, the amnesties are valid only inside Sierra Leone. Once a person 
suspected of atrocities travels abroad, he or she could be arrested and 
prosecuted by the couns of another state exercising universal jurisdiction. 
genOCide, crimes against humamty, war crimes and other serious violations of intemational 
humanitarian law". 5/1999/8362 para 7. See also Amnesty Interna[ional I 999b. 
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And. of course, they can be prosecU[ed by an international criminal 
tribunal, in the unlikely event that one is established, 
9 CONCLUSION 
[\;0 continent has been more ravaged by war in recent decades than 
Africa. Of 27 armed conflicts in 1996. 14 were in Africa, affecting a quar-
ter of all states.' ,'v1illions have been butchered, whole groups have been 
wiped out. Millions have been uprooced and forced to live in refugee 
camps. where they are at particular risk from militias. Living standards 
are reduced to abysmal conditions. Typically, the response of the interna-
tional community is halF-hearted. Platitudes are muttered during visits of 
heads of states and dignitaries, but the message is "you're on your own". 
Europe and America refuse to take responsibility for their role in the crises 
that are burning holes in the continent. To use one recent example, the 
French parliamentary report into the role that France played in Rwanda 
during the genOCide, exonerated France from any responSibility for the 
genOCide or for the existence of the Interahamwe militia." InsuFficient 
steps are taken to curb the flow of arms to the continent and specifically 
to those areas most at risk of conflict' or where conflicts have already 
broken out. These arms are fueling conFlicts which could not be waged 
without them. The responsibility of the international community is to take 
action to halt arms flows to trouble spots and to more closely monitor 
legitimate arms sales. which are often diverted. 
The experiences of Sierra Leone and Rwanda demonstrate that the in-
ternational community will not intervene unless its vital interests are at 
stake, and Africa does noc figure in the equation. One of the worst geno-
cides this century was able to unfold, according to a meticulously drawn-
up plan which was known to the international community. under the nose 
of the international community, and the international community could or 
would do nothing to prevent it. Africa and individual states are effectively 
alone in preventing and responding to major conflicts or atrocities. 
Victims are even more isolated. In the three cases examined, only in 
Rwanda are prosecutions being undertaken in a systematiC and deter-
mined manner. In South Africa and Sierra Leone, however, there is no 
pOSSibility of a judicial remedy. Most victims will just have to learn to live 
with their tormentors living side by side with them and accept the reality 
of justice denied. In all three cases, however, reparations for the victims 
and the establishment of a truth commission are provided for. For some 
victims. this may be enough. The damage is done and there is no resur-
recting the dead. As Sierra Leoneans know only too well, limbs cannot 
grow back. Perhaps if they are assisted in coping with their losses, some 
76 See SIPRI 1998. 
77 Rapport d'information 1271 par la miSSion d'mformation de la commission de la 
Defense Nationaie el des Forces Armees et de la Commission des Affaires Etrangeres 
sur les operations mililaires menees par la France. d'autres pays et I'ONU au Rwanda 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
modicum of justice will be done. But for many victims, justice can only be 
done when the worst offenders are and a moral retribution is 
accomplished. For them, truth can never be an end in itself. Instead, the 
truth has consequences and gives rise to moral and perhaps legal respon-
sibilities. Knowing the truth. one must act on it, in according with one's 
moral and legal obligations. Thus, the exposure of truth by a truth com-
mission without it giving rise to any penal consequences only reinforces 
the sense that justice is the first casualty of truth and reconciliation com-
missions. 
In an imperfect world, the law cannot always be obeyed and the right 
thing done. All political solutions represent a compromise and a truth 
commission is nothing more than a political solution. But cognisant of that 
inherent limitation, one can observe that it is possible for truth commis-
sions to provide a credible and acceptable version of the truth. Whether 
they also promote reconciliation is far more difficult to ascertain. Perhaps 
in individual cases, as before the South African TRC, there may be in-
stances of reconciliation, but it is another thing for any judicial or adminis-
trative body to be able to reconcile different groups and a whole 
population ravaged and traumatised by war or institutionalised repression. 
Healing, if it is possible. takes decades and efforts in many directions. 
Perhaps a TRC can play some role in this multi-dimensional process, but it 
is too much to expect any single administrative or judicial body to be the 
major force for reconciliation in the country. Reconciliation is by-product 
rather than a specific aim of truth commissions. 
Where possible, prosecutions are to be preferred. In some cases, be-
cause of the enormous numbers of accused, it will not be possible to 
perfect justice, but at least efforts should be made to ensure that 
the worst offenders are brought to justice. It must be recognised that in 
situations where there are tens of thousands of criminals and limited 
resources, a state may be in breach of its legal obligations by granting 
amnesties, not because it wants to, but because it has no other realistic 
choice. In these cases, states should be assisted to prosecute the greatest 
number possible and to ensure that serious offenders do not receive 
amnesty. In some cases, prosecutions that are not possible now may 
become possible in the future when the political situation changes. Where 
the opportunity arises, they should be pursued, in fulfillment of the inter-
national legal obligations of states. 
The legal situation regarding amnesties shows that the concept of state 
sovereignty is changing. States can still pass whatever laws they wish, but 
those laws need not be recognised, and persons amnestied under national 
amnesty laws can still be subject to prosecution before the national courts 
of third states or by an international criminal court. States may still be 
able to do what they want, and even then only up to a point, but their 
nationals and officials cannot, and when a state fails in its international 
obligations, other states or an international court can act in lieu of the 
state. It is true that, at least in a virtual sense, the world has become a 
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Victims may not yet be any safer in their beds bUt at least their cries are 
starling to be heard, 
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